Trump Administration’s Initiatives in Resolving North Korea’s Nuclear Problem: Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Approach by Kim, Youngshik & Han, Chonghee
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
International Journal of Emerging Trends in Social Sciences 
ISSN: 2521-3539 
Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 41-51, 2018 
DOI: 10.20448/2001.22.41.51 
 
Trump Administration’s Initiatives in Resolving North Korea’s Nuclear Problem: 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Approach 
 
 
Youngshik Kim1 
Chonghee Han2  
 
1Professor emeritus, PhD Department of Public Administration Sejong University, Seoul Korea. 
 2Professor, PhD Department of Public Administration Kwangwoon University, Seoul Korea. 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The purpose of the paper is to review the applicability of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), the so-called Nunn-Lugar 
program to North Korea in an effort to denuclearize the country. To 
this end, it focuses on analysis of some US scholars and experts‟ 
initiatives on that program based on lessons learned from the former 
Soviet Union to set the ground rules for resolving North Korea‟s 
nuclear issues because the US has been a salient country able to serve 
as an engine of non-proliferation and expertise that can be used around 
world. This article argues that the ground rules should be built in 
terms of clarifying the concept of threats, identifying the means of 
strike capability, and choosing the participants and their roles in the 
negotiation in order to increase the possibility of success for the CTR 
program on North Korea. In line with these principles, US-Republic of 
Korea (ROK) coordination would be crucial, despite of obstacles like 
DPRK‟s objection of ROK‟s involvement in this process of bilateral 
engagement between US and DPRK. The ROK would need to be more 
actively engaged in the CTR program with the help of financial 
resources as well as technical assistance that could make a soft landing 
for North Korea‟s CTR program, as the Korean Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) during the mid-1990s envisioned. It is more 
likely to apply this approach to North Korea‟s nuclear program and to 
achieve a good result in resolving North Korean nuclear problems by 
the active participation of the two co-sponsor and co-initiator of CTR 
model, Nunn and Lugar, into the discussions in the administration of 
President Trump. 
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1. Introduction 
In geo-political terms, the Korean peninsula, situated as a buffer zone between continental  and ocean 
powers, historically suffered from the expansion policies of the dominating power at many times. The US has 
been engaged in the peninsula since the 1950s, based on a balance of power theory, and contributed to security 
and stability in north-east Asia.  
Given the traditional power rivalry of neighboring countries, nuclear confrontation between the US and 
North Korea is complicating the power nexus in this region, casting a bleak outlook on the possible 
reunification of the peninsula.  
South Koreans, who have enjoyed economic advantage over the North Korean regime, shocked by the 
recent North‟s 5th nuclear tests, especially among their conservative leaders, could not even conceive of 
proposing a conversation on rapprochement to their counterparts. Those Presidents of the conservative 
parties since 2007, despite their rosy visions of a unified Korea, could not have ushered in substantial progress 
by their talk of conciliation between the two Koreas, emphasizing only the importance of denuclearization of 
North Korea. 
 In their one chance for talking between the North-South military authorities, held in October 2014, the 
Southern part proposed an agenda of denuclearization and confidence building measures, but Northern part, 
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disregarding those agenda of the South, raised the problem of replacing the armistice agreement with the 
peace agreement, and criticized the southern government‟s propaganda policy against the North Korean 
regime. 
 The North-South relations are deadlocked, have cut off all the communication lines, including the 
shutdown of Kaesung Industrial Complex on February 10, 2016, are exchanging only threats of bombing their 
counter part‟s main city areas. South Korea, which would be under the conservative regime, until the 
presidential election in May 2017, seems to have no possibility of proposing or accepting a dialogue between 
the two countries. The political situation, however, has turned around to a positive environment for the 
relations between the two Koreas after the election of President Moon, a progressive. 
 On the other hand, the incoming Secretary of Defense, Matttis, in a hearing in the Senate, on January 12 
2017, said he was going to adopt a cautious approach toward North Korea, in terms of resolving the impasse 
with North Korea, and was going to look at their negotiating stances and work together with the State 
Department, carefully mingling with a call for diplomacy (Kirk, 2017). 
 In his address of 8 September 2016, celebrating 25 years of creating the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) programs, former Senator Lugar expressed his concern about nuclear weapon program of North Korea, 
and said he is willing to go anywhere to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
(Lugar, 2016).  
Even now, Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, is rating, high the strategic 
importance of the Korean peninsula, saying that the US military would remain on the peninsula after the 
unification (Haass, 2016). President Trump remarked at the press conference 
 with the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Shinzo Abe on 10 February 2017, that he considered defense 
against the North Korean missiles and nuclear threat to a high priority.1 In a joint communique signed on 30 
June 2017, after their first talks between two Presidents, Trump and Moon, United States of America and 
Republic of Korea, the two summits agreed to deal with the threat of North Korea‟s nuclear program as a 
highest priority policy matter (Yonhap News Agency, 2017). 
 
2. CTR Studies on the Korean Peninsula 
The CTR program was initiated as Nunn-Lugar in 1991 in the US Congress which officially established 
the CTR program as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act by Senators Nunn and Lugar. It was renamed 
in 1993 as Cooperative Threat Reduction and was evaluated as a success (Miller, 1995) reducing nuclear 
arsenals in Russia from 30,000 in 1991 to about 12,000 warheads today, with the US Congress funding 
10,562.1 million dollars from 1991 to 2016 (Walker, 2016).  
According to Ashton Carter, this was a major historic achievement for mankind and through Nunn-Lugar 
nuclear disaster was averted (Carter, 2005). Around 1996, the activities of the CTR program in Russia were 
almost finished with success, but then there arose the problem of expanding the program to non-Russian areas 
like Albania and Libya. 
 The Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act in 2003 opened this program to states other than former the Soviet 
Union.  
But before the US Congress authorized funding that program in non-Russian areas, the problem of 
applying the program to the Korean peninsula was raised in the conferences of scholars, like that in the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in December 2005.   
In March 2001, DFI International, which had supported the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), 
an agency of the US Department of Defense since 1999, opined that CTR could offer the means of facilitating a 
US-North Korean agreement to eliminate Pyongyang‟s ballistic missile program and also provide security for 
ultimately terminating North Korea‟s WMD assets during a normalization of relations between the North and 
South (DFI International, 2001).  
Joel Wit and his colleagues considered the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 
which was established by the US-North Korean Agreement in 1994, as a new model of CTR (Wit, Wolfsthal, 
& Choong-suk, 2005).  
Stephen Bosworth, as the first employee of KEDO, who was asked by the State Department‟s Tom 
Hubbard about his willingness to direct the institution, said in his interview in July 2012, that the Republican 
Administration at that time was not supportive of KEDO (Bermudez, 2013). Note that, although there is an 
Office of CTR in the State Department, there is no mission for reducing threats in the Defense Department.  
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which does have a function of reducing threats, was created in 
1998. To apply the CTR approach to North Korea, it is essential to expand areas of possible application. 
However, CTR funding cannot be used in countries under US sanctions. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1White House Office of  the Press Secretary, “Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,” February 10, 2017, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/10/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-and-prime-minister-shinzo-abe (accessed February 20, 
2017). 
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2.1. A New Approach to North Korea’s Nuclear Problems  
Around 2005, there was new speculation about a way to tackle North Korea‟s nuclear problems. As 
mentioned above, starting with Joel Wit, there appeared some articles about  those issues, like that of (Cerami, 
2005).  
In Wit et al. (2005) published by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), “The Six Party 
Talks and Beyond: Cooperative Threat Reduction and North Korea,” they explained the CTR with no reference to 
the background, not mentioning the Nunn-Lugar Act.  
They analyzed the positions of supporters and skeptics about applying CTR to North Korea, but in 
general they were more prone to assess its application pessimistically, resembling the US Congress‟s skeptical 
attitude on funding on North Korea. In their doubtful assessment of the CTR program on North Korea, they 
would be more hopeful about the Six Party Talks and its positive effect on the CTR program on North Korea.  
For dealing with North Korea‟s nuclear issues, Joel Wilt continuously included Japan and the EU in the 
process of negotiation, especially in sharing the burden of funds.  
He intentionally used the participating countries as being more like partners working with a host state in 
the negotiations and did not take into account the position or role of the Republic of Korea government. It is 
notable that in a report to the National Academy of Sciences, Harrington and DeThomas emphasized that “as 
the number of participants increases, the task of this grows” (Harrington & Joseph, 2010) and also that “the 
International Standard Text Code (ISTC) could have begun operations six months earlier if it had not been for 
a late EU decision to insist on agreement texts in all EU languages, rather than in Russian and English as 
originally agreed” (Harrington & Joseph, 2010).  
This problem of complexity was also pointed out as something to be overcome that conflicting objectives 
and priorities within participating states in any attempt to eliminate WMDs would be manifested.  
On top of that, the lack of institutions and established planning in the negotiation field has always 
necessitated extensive coordination between partners (Bleek, Chen, & Joshua, 2016). In line with these points 
of view that could lead to effective negotiation, a few things need to be considered important in understanding 
and learning the lessons of CTR in Russia that could be applied to the North Korean case. Firstly, clarifying 
the concept of threats matters.  
In applying the CTR program, it is crucial to grasp the meaning of “threat”. In the Russian case, the 
threat was clear, because nuclear weapons were limited to those formerly possessed by the Soviet Union. It 
may be useful to differentiate the terms “danger” from “threat”. Simply possessing some arms does not 
constitute a threat, but can be a danger to somebody.  
If someone or one group uses his arms to threaten another‟s life or security, it can become a threat. 
Secondly, indentifying the means of strike capability is also essential. In terms of being elements of threat, 
nuclear weapons, in particular, can be divided into warheads and missiles.  
In the case of North Korea, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) would be needed to attack the US 
nuclear warheads, and missiles would be essential in forming real threats to the US. It can be said around 2016 
that there gloomed the possibility of North Korea striking at the US after its fifth nuclear test, in September 
2016. Lastly, choosing the participants and their roles in the negotiations is to be taken into account. The US 
CTR engagement in former Soviet areas was in most cases based on bilateral relations, like the US-Uzbek 
ones.  
Yet, in CTR 2.0, multiple countries are involved, because of the funds needed to implement the CTR 
programs. According to the National Academy of Sciences in 2009, CTR 2.0 was presented as a new model for 
CTR for the North Korean case, with the central role of the US Department of Defense working together with 
four countries, including Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan, as its partners (National Academy of Sciences, 
2009). But Stephan Bosworth, on 19 July 2012, argued that in the KEDO there arouse the problems of cultural 
gaps among the partners, and he indicated that in particular Japan, raising the issue of Japanese people 
abducted by North Korea, was not positive in engaging with North Korea (Bosworth, 2012). Likewise, 
Jungmin Kang pointed out various conflicts that might emerge between the North and South as well as 
between the individual countries involved (2009). 
 
2.2. North Korea’s Position about their Nuclear Programs 
Since last year, North Korea has been negatively responding to the Six-Party Talks and insisting on 
having nuclear talks with the US Choe Sun-hui, Deputy Director General of American Affairs, Foreign 
Minister of North Korea, declared that Pyongyang had seen the Six-Party Talks framework as dead. 
Accordingly, in a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson‟s statement on April 30 2016, the September 
19 Joint Statement from the talks in 2005 had finally perished (Kim, 2016).  
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Some skeptics, like Joel Wit, cast doubt on the possibility of North Korea‟s giving up their nuclear 
program. In spite of such pessimistic points of view, considering that North Korea‟s long-standing claim on 
the necessity for their nuclear program is based on their concern that their security has been threatened by the 
US forces‟ annual military drills in and around the Korean peninsula, the possibility of their call for a quid pro 
quo, compensation for renouncing the nuclear weapons could be presumed to exist as a bargaining chip. 
The North Korean regime has been demanding that the US conclude their peace agreement and establish 
normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Stephen Bosworth and William Perry are sharing the 
opinion that it was the Bush Administration that cut off, in March 2000, the dialogue with North Korea. Perry, 
former US Secretary of Defense, attributing the failure of the Six Party Talks to the US misconception of 
North Korea‟s objective or their way of thinking, suggested that more realistic policies are needed to deal with 
the communist country‟s growing threat (Perry, 2017).  
Carterr and William (2000) revealed that they were determined to implement the Senator‟s vision, which 
was at that time a case of Arms Control. But in his recent interview with Joel Wit, in January 2017, Perry 
criticized the US deterrence strategy against North Korea‟s threat to test ICBMs and put emphasis on the 
uselessness of deterrence without knowing the country‟s real objectives such as survival, recognition, and 
improvement of Economy.  
Perry, enumerating alternative plans against North Korea like surgical striking, intercepting, or 
disrupting, said that he would not recommend what he had come up with before in the article with Carter “If 
Necessary, Strike and Destroy” (Washington Post, 2016) because of its devastating effect on South Korea. 
Strategically, he advised a negotiation as an essential starting step, opposing the Six-Party Talks calling on 
North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.  
This means that a much more realistic approach to the nuclear weapons puzzle in North Korea should 
focus on the feasibility of the reduction of threats. Furthermore, he stressed the importance of American 
“Extended Deterrence” not as a defensive meaning or as a sign of strength, but to give a clear message of 
responding to a North Korean challenge by demonstrating the possible use of the US strategic assets. Citing 
the case of 2000, when North Korea showed interest in negotiations with the United States‟ proposed 
nonproliferation and suspended the nuclear test, Perry, however, said that the simple suspension of the US-
South Korean annual military exercises would not be acceptable enough as a starting point for new 
negotiations with North Korea. 
 
2.3. CTR Program in North Korea 
The CTR model is based on two elements: a strategy and a process. The success of the CTR strategy 
depends on compatible national interests, voluntary compliance, and transparency (DFI International: 8). The 
Nunn-Lugar CTR program originally provided funding and expertise for countries of concern, like the former 
Soviet Union, to decommission nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons stockpiles as agreed on by the Soviet 
Union and Russia.  
After nuclear warheads were removed by the military from their delivery vehicles, Nunn-Lugar assistance 
provided equipment and supplies to destroy the missiles on which the warheads had been mounted, as well as 
the soils which had contained the missiles. Warheads were then eliminated, with the highly enriched uranium 
contained in them made into commercial reactor fuel that was purchased by the US under a separate program 
(Ksssenova, 2016).  
As shown in the DFI International report, the process of CTR consists of the following six steps 
including umbrella agreements, which are agreements between the government of the United States of 
America and the government of the Russian Federation regarding cooperation in the area of nuclear material 
physical protection, control, and accounting, implementing agreements, requiring information, contracting 
process, execution/delivery, and audits & examination (DFI International, 2001). 
 In sum, CTR has four key goals: to dismantle WMDs, to consolidate, and secure WMDs, related 
technology, and materials, to increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct, and to support 
defense and military cooperation in order to prevent proliferations of nuclear weapons. Since 2009, to uphold 
these principles, Nuclear Security Centers have been established in partner countries in order to increase 
training capability, consistent with international best practices, for nuclear security, material control, 
inventory management, transport security, and other activities important for improving nuclear security 
through coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  
The CTR program was managed by the US Department of Defense, but also by the Department of 
Energy, and the Department of State, and had to provide the equipment for dismantlement and then to secure 
vulnerable materials, to strengthen physical security, to upgrade detection capabilities to prevent nuclear 
smuggling and to redirect thousands of former weapon scientists into civilian projects.  
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Seen from such common ground on addressing nuclear-armed nations, the bottom line is that the 
organizational culture of various CTR participants could have a direct impact on the success, or lack thereof, 
of cooperative projects. In addition, in an environment of transition from an adversarial relationship to 
partnership, cooperation in the nuclear field remains extremely sensitive for both sides (Ksssenova, 2016). 
To start a CTR program in North Korea requires an agreement between first of all, the Democratic 
People‟s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States of America (USA), similar to the “Umbrella 
Agreement” signed in June 17, 1992, between the USA and the Russian Federation, through which the 
American government, under the CTR program provided funding and expertise to the partner country. In line 
with that, however, at the time of application of the relevant program to DPRK, in organizing a committee or 
meeting for the discussion of agreement, in particular, it would be advisable to restrict the number of 
participants, for example, to two or three other than the US and North Korea, adding South Korea as an 
observer.  
The objective of the possible meeting is to convince North Korea of the US‟s resolution to solve the 
nuclear problem by CTR. In the process of hammering the resolution home into Pyongyang, it is crucial for 
Washington‟s position to forge a trustworthy relationship with the communist country. The transparency 
problem is also essential for making progress or for success of the CTR program, and for tracking down 
information about the numbers and locations of WMDs, which would ultimately contribute to a productive 
relationship between both participants. The principal meeting between the US and North Korea should be run 
parallel with the North-South dialogue, in which economic incentive elements need to be included to help 
redirect North Korean scientists to civilian jobs. Therefore, in the long run, South Korea should be positively 
engaged in the economic modernization of the people in the North in order to do away with the country‟s 
nuclear weapons. The importance of the South‟s positive engagement can be recognized from the Pakistan 
case, where, after Secretary of State, Powell‟s visit to Pakistan in 2004, the US provided $100 million to the 
country as part of the CTR program, but has not made much progress because of the opposition of the people 
(Pedersen, 2015). 
 
2.4. Funding 
The Nunn-Lugar amendment of 1991 authorized the use in the 1992 fiscal year of $400 million in US 
Department of Defense (DOD) funds to help the Soviet Union and its satellite countries destroy, transport, 
safeguard and not proliferate WMDs. The total budget for 2016 estimates the amount for the CTR program 
to be $358 million (Pellerin, 2016). In Albania, the US provided in 2004 about $20 million for two years to 
destroy its entire stockpile, 16tons of chemical weapons, which were believed to be of Chinese origin (Nguyen, 
2004).  
The US assistance is made possible by the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, signed by President George W. 
Bush in December 2003, which authorized use of up to $50 million in CTR funds for nonproliferation activities 
outside the former Soviet Union, and the legislation introduced by Lugar that would further extend the use of 
such funds, would eliminate the $50million cap on the programs, and would transfer the authority for 
approving funds from the President to the Secretary of Defense. Regardless of the available American funds 
for CTR programs, for the Republic of Korea (ROK) as an opposing party of possible conflict with North 
Korea, it would be legitimate to contribute partly to the total funds needed for those programs. 
 Since August 1990, the ROK government has begun to raise funds to help cooperation between the North 
and South by adopting the Fund Law in 1990. The total amount of the cooperation fund whose sources are 
mostly from the government as of 2016, is 12,856,106 million Won (estimated USD $107,13 million), as shown 
in the statistics below.  
A third of the total is from government raised funds, and according to Budget Officer of the Ministry of 
Unification in South Korea, around 958 million Won (estimated USD $800 million), which has been generated 
from the operating profit alone, could meet the expenses of the CTR.2 The Inter-Korean Fund statistics shows 
that an average of 494,500 million Won (estimated USD $412 million) per year could be raised. An average 
government raised fund per year is 188,220 million Won, (about USD$157 million). For the government to 
take advantage of the accumulated cooperation fund, at least $300 million could be used as a fund for CTR, 
aside from $100 million for humanitarian assistance and economic aids.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 That was what the budget officer would say about the finances during the phone call with one of  the authors, Kim on January 30, 2017.   
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Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. 
Year Government 
fund 
Non-
government 
fund 
Deposit 
received 
 
Operating 
profit 
Total 
accumulated 
(KOR WON) 
Total 
accumulated 
(US dollar)* 
Total 4,893,803 2,723 7,001,274 958,306 12,856,106 10713.42 
2016 92,500 1 207,000 27,399 326,900 272.41 
2015 93,203 238 90,500 19,863 203,804 169.84 
2014 93,400 - 228,600 47,304 369,304 307.75 
2013 105,500 3 530,000 162,300 797,803 664.84 
2012 112,800 2 400,000 51,236 564,038 470.03 
2011 - 2 104,400 38,276 142,678 118.9 
2010 - - 875,000 51,238 926,238 771.87 
2009 - 56 81,000 74,354 155,410 129.51 
2008 650,000 52 147,500 49,274 846,826 705.69 
2007 500,000 75 584,591 38,859 1,123,525 936.27 
2006 650,000 15 940,000 36,619 1,626,634 1355.53 
2005 500,000 33 460,000 31,178 991,211 826.01 
2004 171,400 1 310,000 38,372 519,773 433.14 
2003 300,000 1 823,000 46,515 1,169,516 974.6 
2002 490,000 77 505,000 42,035 1,037,112 864.26 
2001 500,000 1,079 310,000 29,406 840,485 700.4 
2000 100,000 542 254,852 30,393 385,787 321.49 
1999 - 3 149,831 23,013 172,847 144.04 
1998 - - - 40,280 40,280 33.57 
1997 50,000 288 - 27,874 78,162 65.14 
1996 100,000 132 - 18,409 118,541 98.78 
1995 240,000 119 - 14,589 254,708 212.26 
1994 40,000 1 - 9,387 49,388 41.16 
1993 40,000 3 - 4,778 44,781 37.32 
1992 40,000 - - 5,118 45,118 37.6 
1991 25,000 - - 237 25,237 21.03 
(unit: million won). 
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund” (December 2016). 
*added by authors: $1 adjusted to 1200 won. 
 
By the way, one can find an interesting difference between the amounts of government fund raising under 
the progressive regimes of the Kim and Noh administrations from 2000 to 2008; an average amount per year is 
450,000 million Won, about $375 million, but under the conservative one, especially under the current Park 
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regime, the average amount of government-raised funds per year was 96,200 million Won, around $80.1 
million, less than half of the amount for those progressive regimes 
Consider the case of Ukraine, which was left with an estimated 176 ICBMs and 14 nuclear reactors. The 
George H. W. Bush administration‟s pledge of $175 million was more than the real costs. Potter maintains 
that the ROK can be fully charged with the cost of the CTR program in North Korea (Potter, 1995). The 
accumulated funds of ROK‟s own would make Potter‟s claim more feasible and valid in implementing the CTR 
program for North Korea.  
Taking the yearly funding of the US Congress into account, where the lowest funding was $300 million in 
FY 1996, and the highest was $528.5 million in FY 2014, the annual funding by South Korea of $300 million 
would be enough for the North Korean CTR (Walker, 2016). On top of that, according to Goldman and 
O‟Kelly, the costs of LUE conversion and the spent fuel return are presumed to be between $7.5 and $12 
million, taking 2-3 years (Goldman & Sean, 2005).  
Even the 5-megawatt Yongbyun reactor, which would cost billions of dollars, could be burdened with the 
collected civilian funding in South Korea. Kang, a nuclear scientist, has argued that the South Korean 
government expressed interest in the idea of the CTR program, and trained North Koreans during the KEDO 
projects to build the two LWSs. In 2002, the Korean Electric Power Company conducted a 13-week long 
training for 125 North Korean engineers (Kang, 2009). Again, recalling the previous experience of the South, 
in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear problems, it would be crucial for the South Korean government 
to already have economic resources as well as some technical capability in cooperation with the US to 
participate actively in the CTR programs for North Korea. 
Though Sam Nunn who was a former Senator, Democrat and Richard Lugar who was a former Senator, 
Republican differed in their political party affiliations, they worked together as Senators, to realize the 
denuclearization or dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia and former Soviet Union territories, as 
mentioned above. They forged partnership in their efforts to non-proliferate, dismantle or destroy the nuclear 
weapons, to safeguard the nuclear materials in the US Senate. After their retirement from Senate, Lugar in 
2007, Nunn in 1996, Lugar worked in the Lugar Center, a non-profit organization focusing on the nuclear 
non-proliferation problem and Nunn, beginning from 2001, organized Nuclear Threat Initiative ( NTI ), which 
was a non partisan, non profit organization, with the help of Ted Turner to deal with the problem of weapons 
of mass destruction. 
Lugar took part in the USKI (United States-Korea Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of 
Johns Hopkins University) held conference under the title of “Policy Prescriptions for the North Korea 
Threats” in June 2017, and Nunn presented with Mike Mullen, his task force report to Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR ), titled  “A Sharper Choice on North Korea” in September 2016. Lugar take emphasis on the 
application of experiences and lessons learned from the case of dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the 
former Soviet Union territories to North Korean case, and Nunn, with his experiences in NTI, like Nuclear 
Security Projects and Nuclear Security Index, engaged in model programs to shape and implement to reduce 
the threats, and inspire privates and governments efforts to secure and manage the nuclear materials 
(Crowley, 2007).3  
Particularly, Sam Nunn has presented his views on North Korean Nuclear issue several times since 
January 2017, starting from the statement for the record on U.S. Policy toward North Korea to the U.S. 
Senate‟s Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 31, 2017. In this presentation, he indicated the growing 
capability of DPRK to strike U.S. with nuclear weapons, and the grave proliferation danger. He pointed out 
the key role of China in addressing this danger, which was negated by Trump himself in June (Lander & 
Gardiner, 2017).  
And in his interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN on 24th of April, 2017, Nunn opined that US did not seem 
to have a strategy, though he acknowledged that the President is putting emphasis on the diplomatic option 
and on the UN. Nunn, in his interview on 25th of April, he, putting the freeze of weapons and test of missiles 
on the part of North Korea as a goal, said US should have an informal bilateral talks with North Korea. He 
preferred to use “dialogue” instead of “negotiation”, and direct talks and informal talks without preconditions4 
before going to negotiations. 
                                                          
3 Also, see Mariana Budjeryn, “Sen. Sam Nunn: We Have a Choice Between Cooperation or Catastrophe,” Russia Matters, June 20, 2017, 
https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/sen-sam-nunn-we-have-choice-between-cooperation-or-catastrophe (accessed July 1, 2017). In his interview with 
Mariana Budjeryn, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Harvard‟s Belfer Center on June 20, 2017, he presented first his visit to NATO Military Bases in 
1962 gave him to think the real possibility of  nuclear war and the way to prevent, second his visit to NATO in 1974 gave him the information about the 
largest amount of  nuclear weapons and materials, and lastly, his trip to Moscow in August 1991, when Gorbachev was arrested by the Soviet military coup 
and was not in control of  nuclear arsenal, as the background of  his new thinking of  CTR. And it would be necessary, he urged, to take advantage of  learning 
from the US model of  CTR and to apply it to North Korea on the basis of  the experiences of  the former Soviet Union.   
4 In the letter sent to President Trump from six prominent US government officials including William Perry, “informal” and “without precondition“ were 
accentuated. They said it was “ realistic option” and to be held “ in the near future.” See William Perry, “Top Former US Officials Urge President Trump to 
Begin Talks with North Korea,” June 28, 2017, http://www.wjperryproject.org/notes-from-the-brink/top-former-us-officials-urge-president-trump-to-begin-
talks-with-north-korea (accessed July 10, 2017). 
On that point it is notable to compare these words of  Nunn with those of  Rex Tillerson who told on April 27 the NPR the same content. See Michele 
Kelemen, “Trump Administration Wants North Korea at Negotiating Table on Nuclear Weapons,” April 27, 2017, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/04/27/525866684/trump-administration-wants-north-korea-at-negotiating-table-on-nuclear-weapons (accessed June 15, 2017). 
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 He proposed a multi-level talks, including talks between officials, and between military officials. In his 
presentation in the Senate in January, 2017, he made some recommendations to be included and implemented 
in parallel: first offer genuine incentives for North Korea to take part in substantive talks or negotiations, like 
peace agreement to end Korean war and the normalization of relations and to increase pressure or sanction on 
North Korea. He eventually suggested to strong sanctions like suspension of North Korea‟s credentials at the 
UN, and against military attacks of North Korea or refusal to negotiate, he suggested an active proportionate 
self-defense response, including inside North Korea.  
 
3. US-ROK Summit Talks and After 
In June 30, the two Presidents of U. S. and Republic of Korea, reaffirmed in Washington D.C., the mutual 
trust and shared value as allies, and also reaffirmed the their commitment to counter the growing threat to 
peace and security posed by North Korea‟s nuclear and ballistic missile program. And they pledged to continue 
closely to achieve the shared goal of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.  
They reaffirmed the two sides‟ shared top priority to resolve the nuclear issue and they do not maintain a 
hostile policy toward North Korea and together, stand ready to offer a bright future for North Korea if it 
chooses the right path.  
And the two leaders emphasized that the door to dialogue with North Korea remains open under the right 
circumstances, and President Trump supported the ROK‟s leading role in fostering an environment for 
peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula (Yonhap News Agency, 2017).5 
It is generally acknowledged that President Moon had a good result in his diplomacy with the U.S. by his 
first visit to Washington, except the burden-sharing problem and trade. But it is to be reminded that there 
remains lots of obstacles to overcome in the relations with North Korea. First, North Korea adamantly 
reiterated their insistence that the nuclear issue is the matter of concern between U.S. and North Korea 
(Yonhap News Agency, 2017). According to Yonhap news, Nodong shinmun ran an article saying that South 
Korea has no cause to interfere and that the issue did not have any relations with the South-North relations. 
Second, though South Korea obtained a support from the U.S. in playing a leading role in fostering an 
environment for peaceful unification, that unification could not but depend on the resolution of nuclear issue.  
At most, the possible means of fostering the relaxation of tensions, and if possible the confidence building 
measures which support the stability and security of the peninsula, could be discussed between the two Koreas. 
It‟s imperative, first of all, to have a dialogue, and to make a progress in the relations between the two. It 
is to have a plan, or roadmap, not strategy, if one takes into account the four principles which were declared in 
the special address of President Moon on June 3o in CSIS.  
The four principles in the policy for North Korea are, first, No antagonistic policy to DPRK, second, No 
military attack to North Korea, third, No Regime change or collapse of North Korea, and fourth, No 
intentional acceleration in the process of unification of Korea (Seoul Daily, 2017).  
And President Moon, during his participation in G-20 Conference held in Germany, on July 6, 2017 made 
a declaration in his address that he would pursue a peace treaty to end a war with North Korea, taking a step 
forward for reconciliation and he would take a comprehensive approach to North Korea‟s nuclear issues. He 
reconfirmed President Trump‟s reassurance and support in his intention to have a dialogue and inter-Korean 
exchanges with North Korea, though under certain condition (Korea Times, 2017). While he mentioned 
human rights records of United Nations about North Korea, he also took emphasis on humanitarian aid for 
civilians.  
Though the CTR approach to Korean peninsula‟s denuclearization problem does not raise a serious 
problem in its development of technical process of denuclearization, the essential question for this approach is 
how to lead North Korea to its bargaining table. It is generally understood among concerned parties that all 
the sanctions including UN are to lead North Korea to the diplomatic table. After his inauguration of supreme 
leader in North Korea, Kim Jung-un made a dozen missile tests in 2017 only and three nuclear tests since 
December 2011. 
After his July 4th missile test, he expressed it as his present to America on the Independence Day. But as 
irony would have it, it was the 45th anniversary of the 7.4 South-North Joint communique, which proclaimed 
the independent and peaceful unification of Korea in national unity. It raised the debate on the nature of the 
missile among Russians who insisted that that was not ICBM as proclaimed by Americans. Russians were 
insisted that the missile was not ICBM but Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).  
The difference in their conceptions surrounding the deterrence resulted in their evaluation of the nature of 
that missile. From the claimers of Russian deterrence, the purpose of North Korea‟s missile test was to assure 
their capability of targeting US bases and Allies in the North East Asia, not targeting US mainland. According 
to a media report, the 6th test of nuclear bomb is on the list.  
 
 
                                                          
5 For full text of  the joint statement issued by South Korea, see “Korea, U.S. Issue Joint Summit Statement,” Yonhap News Agency (2017). 
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NYT reported, citing a report issued by 38 North, a research Institute of John‟s Hopkins University, 
Joseph Bermudez said “The rugged test site appeared able to conduct a sixth nuclear test, at any time upon 
receiving order” (Broad, 2017). After the launching of ICBM or IRBM on July 4, lots of American scholars 
have expressed a pessimistic view, like Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst (NPR, 2017) and some of the 
hawkish consultants like Michael Auslin, a Williams-Griffith Fellow, take a very negative attitude toward 
North Korea (Auslin, 2017). 
Besides the recent worsening situation for solving the North Korean nuclear issue, another obstacle was 
to be overcome is what Michael Krepon pointed out in his book, “Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, 
and the Nuclear Future” (Krepon, 2003). Krepon, while analyzing the policy transitions from Mutual Assured 
Destruction to CTR in strategic arms control, placed Cooperative Threat Reduction in his third transition 
period after the second transition period in which Reagan Administration put emphasis on strategic arms 
reduction. Through the three transition period, according to Krepon, there was a persistent debate among 
scholars and government officials about the military policy surrounding strategic arms control (2003: 249-
250).  
“Dominators”, a prevailing group formed by government officials and republican party‟s inclination, 
insisted US‟s nuclear superiority putting emphasis on the military activities, missile defense, based on the non-
proliferation, for example, like a “National Posture Review released in 2002 in Bush Administration (2003: 
106-113). On the other hand, “Conciliators “ under the review from future perspective, dis-equilibrium should 
be changed, putting emphasis on treaties, cooperation among states, and diplomacy with persuasion based on 
trust among states, forming a coalition and partenership (2003). 
After Presidential election in 2ooo, Dominators are prevailing, acting with unilateral and military actions, 
sloughing off the treaties restraining military flexibility. Criticized by Conciliators, Dominators are changing 
to form a coalition to prevent the isolation from the Allies, which was caused by putting too much value on the 
missile defense.  
As mentioned above, the deterrence concept was crucial in its relations with China and Russia particularly 
in the pursuit of non-proliferation. Krepon claimed that China, Russia, take into account the deterrence as a 
capability to give minimal destruction to US in the days of US superiority in nuclear, conventional forces 
including missile defense (2003: 187-189). It is highly possible to presume that North Korea would come up to 
negotiation table, with in a year, when they think they secured the deterrence, or when they are ready to talk 
with strong hand to US by assuring their strong strategic position with their Hwasong-14, or Pukkuksong 1, 
2 missiles. It would be a good guide to assess the recent North Korean missile tests and their future direction 
of missile development. It is notable that recently the President of Council on Foreign Relations, Richard 
Hass, proposed, after considering three alternatives, first, reluctant acceptance of North Korea as nuclear state, 
second, use of military attacks, third, multilateral negotiations, like six-party talks, to try diplomacy first on 
North Korea (Haass, 2017).  
It is important to note that Haas, presumed to belong to Dominators, has proposed “diplomacy”, which is 
the essential instrument of conciliators. It is also remarkable that Choe Son-hui, director-general of the North 
America affairs of North Korean Foreign Ministry, told reporters in at the Beijing Capital International 
Airport in May 2017, that North Korea would hold dialogue under right conditions with the new US 
administration (Stanglin, 2017). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
It was actually Kim Jung-il who concluded the Agreed Framework with the US on October 21, 1994, after 
Kim Il-sung‟s death on July 8, 1994. It may be said that Kim Jung-un just followed the will of Kim Jung-il in 
his pursuit of nuclear weapons, and then it would be better to remember that it was also Kim Jung-il who 
wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with the US by dispatching General Cho Myung-rok as his personal 
special envoy to meet President Clinton on October 10, 2000.  
Recently, a South Korean expert on the North Korean nuclear problem revealed that North Korea is 
presumed to have 45 nuclear weapons and also the nuclear materials of 52kg of plutonium and 280kg of HEU 
(Sooyeon, 2017). In addition, in October 2008, the ROK Defense Ministry estimated that North Korea might 
have between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons with 150 warheads for ballistic missiles 
(Bermudez, 2013). 
While celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program on May 9, 2016, Carter praised 
the forward-looking statement that helped make the historic change. As he said, it was brand-new thought 
which might be paradoxical to some, and it was controversial, but the two senators, irrespective of their 
political parties, made a global breakthrough in the nuclear weapons field. It is only the USA that has 
expertise and funding for a CTR program and the only success history of denuclearization. In their testimony 
to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on January 31, 2017, Nicholas Eberstadt emphasized working 
with allies, but acting unilaterally, at the same time, arguing that the US can bluff then mitigate, and 
eventually eliminate the WMDs of North Korea by Threat Reduction Eberstadt (2017).  
With emphasis on US-ROK close coordination, as a way of dealing with the North Korean threat, Scott 
Snyder has very recently recommended dispatching a special envoy and separating the North Korean problem 
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from other contentious issues in US-China relations, though not apparently mentioning the CTR program 
(Snyder, 2017).  
With the comprehensive approach to North Korea‟s nuclear problem including the CTR program, the US 
and the ROK should jointly organize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and consequently peace as 
well as stability in north-east Asia. As explained by Senator Lugar after 20 years, “No one would have 
predicted in the 1980s that Americans and Russians would be working together to destroy weapons in the 
former Soviet Union, and the Nunn-Lugar Program can be applied around the world” (NPR, 2017).  
Keeping the significance of the Nunn-Lugar‟s CTR program and the close US-ROK cooperation in mind, 
it would be a good concluding remark to reiterate what the designated US Secretary of Defense said in his 
Senate confirmation hearings, on 12 January 2017, that his primary mission at the Pentagon would be 
allowing the State Department to negotiate from a “position of strength” to avoid conflict in an era of rapidly 
evolving world wide threats to work with and strengthen our alliances (Steele, 2017).  
It is irony to see the South Korea‟s Central Bank‟s revelation that North Korea‟s economy grew 
3.9percent in 2016, its fastest pace in 17 years. Despite of international sanctions due to the nuclear 
development program since 2006 and food shortages, overall exports from North Korea also rose to $2.82 
billion thanks to the fishery products (Reuters, 2017). 
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